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1 Introduction
In the highly receptive world of today’s financial markets populated with central banks’
watchers, economic analysts, and various economic commentators, disclosure policies assume
great importance. On any given day, many institutions with high public visibility such as
government agencies, central banks, international organizations and rating agencies release
news potentially aﬀecting the allocative eﬃciency in the economy.
In this paper, we model the eﬀect of public information on investment decisions and study
whether the disclosure of more precise public information is socially beneficial. We show
that public information can trigger systemic liquidity shortages, and hence be the source of
allocative ineﬃciency, in an economy with uninsurable aggregate shocks to firms’ production
and limited commitment. We also show that increasing the quality of public information,
not only may reduce social welfare, but also has redistributive eﬀects in the economy. More
precise public information makes entrepreneurs (weakly) better oﬀ and financiers (weakly)
worse oﬀ.
We develop a general equilibrium model with three periods. At date 0 a continuum
of wealthless risk-neutral entrepreneurs have access only to a risky investment technology
with partially verifiable returns. Wealthy, risk-neutral financiers decide how much capital
to provide to entrepreneurs and how much to invest in an alternative technology with non-
verifiable payoﬀs. At date 1, entrepreneurs’ technology is hit by an aggregate liquidity
shock: with positive probability, all entrepreneurs need to raise new capital to meet their
reinvestment needs. Only if they secure new funds, they produce a return at date 2. Their
ability to raise new funds depends on the aggregate resources available at date 1, which in
turn depend on the funds originally invested at date 0: more entrepreneurs’ investment at
date 0 leaves fewer resources for refinancing at date 1.
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Compared with the constrained eﬃcient solution (i.e. social planner economy with
the same constraints as the private economy), the competitive equilibrium exhibits over-
investment, as atomistic entrepreneurs do not internalize through prices the impact of their
collective investment decisions on the equilibrium risk of liquidity shortage. The investment
decisions of some entrepreneurs impose a negative externality on others because of capital
rationing: their investments reduce the resources available for future refinancing and thus
increase the equilibrium probability of liquidity shortage for all entrepreneurs.
The sources of ineﬃcient investment are financial market and contract incompleteness. In
particular, there are no tradeable technologies with payoﬀs independent of liquidity shocks,
and both entrepreneurs and financiers have limited ability to commit to future payments.
As such, entrepreneurs are unable to insure against liquidity shocks either via markets or
contracts. If entrepreneurs could insure against liquidity shocks — for instance, by trading
claims on financiers’ technologies or purchasing lines of credit — they would fully internalize
the risk of liquidity shortage via the insurance cost. However, market incompleteness and
the non-verifiability of financiers’ payoﬀs rule out such insurance possibilities. Similarly, if
entrepreneurs’ investment returns were fully contractible, then financiers would fully price
the risk of liquidity shortage in the cost of financing, regardless of the existence of insurance
possibilities.
The paper delivers three main contributions. First, we investigate the impact of public
information on the competitive equilibrium. We show that investment ineﬃciency and
liquidity shortages arise only in the presence of an informative, but imperfect, public signal.
Furthermore, a more informative public signal can be welfare reducing because it exacerbates
the negative externality in entrepreneurs’ investment decisions. The non-monotonicity in
the relationship between the informativeness of the public signal and social welfare arises
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because entrepreneurs’ costly eﬀort (in excess of their non-verifiable investment return)
generates a trade-oﬀ in the investment demand, and makes aggregate investment strictly
increasing in the quality of public information. As such, an improvement in the quality of
public information, leads to more investment, which feedbacks into more capital rationing
and lower welfare.
Second, we show that a change in the quality of public information has redistributive
eﬀects in the economy. Entrepreneurs always prefer high information quality as they benefit
from the improved expected returns on investment. Conversely, financiers are better oﬀ with
low information quality as they extract rents from liquidity shortages. As such, an increase
in the quality of public information is not a Pareto improvement.
Third, we show that the constrained eﬃcient allocation, which would be chosen by a so-
cial planner who can coordinate entrepreneurs’ actions given their available information, can
be achieved as a competitive market equilibrium outcome via investment restrictions and
targeted disclosure of information. Investment restrictions on financiers prevent excessive
risk taking and systemic liquidity shortages by optimally restricting aggregate investment
in entrepreneurs’ technology. With targeted disclosure of information, only informed en-
trepreneurs would invest, thus limiting welfare-reducing liquidity shortages. For those who
access the information, a high informativeness about underlying fundamentals enhances ef-
ficiency of private decisions. Investment restrictions and the degree of disclosure should
optimally vary with the informativeness of the public signal. No investment restrictions and
full disclosure of public information are optimal only when the quality of the public signal
is suﬃciently high.
Our paper belongs to a large literature analyzing pecuniary externalities in incomplete
markets. Most of this literature builds on Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1985)’s result
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that competitive equilibria may be constrained ineﬃcient when markets are incomplete. One
strand of this literature focuses on the fire-sale externalities induced typically by a collateral
constraint (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Krishnamurthy, 2003;
Lorenzoni, 2008; Acharya and Vishwanathan, 2010; and Jeanne and Korinek, 2010). An-
other strand of the literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Allen and Gale, 1994; Caballero and
Krishnamurthy, 2001; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; and He and Kondor, 2012) focuses
on uninsurable shocks either to preferences (as in Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) or to firms’
production technologies (as in Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). Our model builds on Holm-
strom and Tirole (1998) and investigates the importance of public information as a source
of investment ineﬃciency and liquidity crises from positive and normative viewpoints.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the social value of information dating
back to Hirshleifer (1971), who shows how disclosure of public information may preempt
socially valuable risk-sharing opportunities. More recently, Morris and Shin (2002), Angele-
tos and Pavan (2004, 2007), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) examine the impact of public
information when agents’ payoﬀs exhibit exogenous externalities like in Keynesian beauty
contests. Adding to this literature, we study the eﬀect of public information in an economy
with endogenous externalities.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, derive
the main results, and discuss the sources of ineﬃciency. Section 3 considers the normative
implications. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2 The Model
We consider an economy with three periods, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, a continuum of entrepreneurs
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and a continuum of financiers indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. There is one
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(perishable) good used for both consumption and investment. All agents are risk-neutral
and derive utility from consumption at date 1 and 2: U = c1 + c2.
Entrepreneurs have no initial capital endowment and they have access to a decreasing-
returns-to-scale investment opportunity. Any capital investment I ∈ [0,W ] at date 0 pro-
duces a verifiable return, R > 1, and a non-verifiable return, or private benefit, b > 0, at
date 2, per unit of capital. Any capital investment above W returns zero. The project also
requires an initial eﬀort cost per unit of invested capital k > 0 (in units of consumption).
At date 1, all projects are subject to an aggregate liquidity shock: each entrepreneur must
invest an additional amount eλ ≥ 0 per unit of capital to realize the investment return at date
2, otherwise the project terminates and yields nothing. For simplicity, the liquidity shock
takes only the value of 0 (no liquidity shock) or 1 (liquidity needs equal initial investment)
with equal probabilities.
Financiers have an initial endowment of capital W > 0. They can use it either to
finance entrepreneurs or to invest in their own technology, which produces a non-verifiable
return erj at date 1, taking the value of 1/π, with probability π ∈ (0, 1), or the value of 0
otherwise. The expected return on financiers’ technology is thus 1. The returns on financiers’
technology are independent and identically distributed across financiers, and independent
from the aggregate liquidity shock, eλ.
The non-verifiability of the returns b and erj is the source of limited commitment in the
model, which leads to ineﬃcient investment, as discussed in Section 2.2.3.
The timeline of events is described in Figure 1. At date 0, all agents observe the public
signal θ ∈ {L,H} about the size of the liquidity shock and make investment and financing
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decisions. The signal is distributed as follows:
Pr
³
θ = H|eλ = 0´ = Pr³θ = L|eλ = 1´ = σ,
where σ ∈ [1/2, 1] measures its informativeness, with σ = 1/2 being perfectly uninformative
and σ = 1 being perfectly informative. Using Bayes’ rule, entrepreneurs and financiers
compute the conditional probabilities of the liquidity shock as
μθ ≡ Pr
³eλ = 0|θ´ = ( σ if θ = H
1− σ if θ = L
where Pr (θ = H) = Pr (θ = L) = 1/2. In order to finance their investment, entrepreneurs
raise capital against the future risky investment proceeds at date 2. Each entrepreneur
applies for funding in exchange for a fraction α0 ∈ [0, 1] of the verifiable investment proceeds.
Financiers choose whether to provide funding or to invest in their own technology.
At date 1, the liquidity shock eλ ∈ {0, 1} hits the economy. When eλ = 0, there is
no need of additional funds. Entrepreneurs continue the projects and their final payoﬀs
are realized at date 2. When eλ = 1, entrepreneurs need an additional unit of capital per
each unit of invested capital, which they can raise by selling a fraction α1 ∈ [0, 1] of the
project to new financiers. If the aggregate resources available are not suﬃcient to meet the
aggregate reinvestment needs, i.e. there is a liquidity shortage, entrepreneurs are rationed.
Entrepreneurs’ projects continue and their final payoﬀs at date 2 are rescaled according to
the amount of funds secured.
At date 2, financiers consume their profits and entrepreneurs consume their investment
proceeds net of financiers’ repayments.
We make three assumptions for the following analysis:
Assumption 1: R+b ≥ 1+k. We require the project’s net present value in the absence
of a liquidity shock (eλ = 0) to be positive. This assumption ensures the existence of a
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positive entrepreneurs’ demand of investment.
Assumption 2: k ≥ b. This is a suﬃcient condition to ensure the existence of a trade-
oﬀ in entrepreneurs’ demand of investment. If entrepreneurs’ non-verifiable return b exceeds
in expectation the eﬀort cost k, entrepreneurs would always demand capital for investment
regardless of the investment quality.
Assumption 3: R ≤ 3/2. We assume that the project’s expected pledgeable return is
suﬃciently low that there is no investment in the absence of public information since there
is no supply of capital. This also implies no investment in the presence of public information
with θ = L. This restriction emphasizes the role of public information as a trigger for over-
investment and simplifies the exposition of the analysis. Our main finding of information
induced investment ineﬃciency extends also to the case with R > 3/2, which we present for
completeness only in Appendix B.
2.1 Social Planner Allocation
In this section, we characterize the constrained first-best allocation useful to benchmark
the competitive market equilibrium. In such a case, the social planner would choose the
aggregate investment I to solve the following problem:
max
I∈[0,W ]
W + [μθ (R+ b) + (1− μθ) ρ (R+ b− 1)− (1 + k)] I (1)
s.t. ρ = min
½
W − I
I
, 1
¾
.
The first term is financiers’ endowment W , while the second term in brackets denotes the
expected net present value (NPV) from entrepreneurs’ investment inclusive of eﬀort costs.
The expected NPV from entrepreneurs’ investment takes into account the proportion of
investment securing new financing in the event of a liquidity shock. Such proportion, ρ,
depends on the occurrence of capital rationing. Given that there is a continuum of financiers
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with mass 1 and i.i.d. erj (with E (erj) = 1), by the law of large numbers, the aggregate
supply of liquidity is W − I. Hence, the proportion of entrepreneurs’ investment securing
new financing at date 1 is ρ = min
©
W−I
I , 1
ª
.
The next proposition summarizes the social planner allocations and corresponding wel-
fare.
Proposition 1 (Social Planner Allocation). Let bσ ≡ 2 + k −R− b and bbσ ≡ R+b+k
2(R+b)−1 .
The social planner’s investment decision is:
ICFB =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if θ = L or (θ = H and σ ∈ [1/2, bσ))£
0, W
2
¤
if θ = H and σ = bσ
W
2
if θ = H and σ ∈
³bσ, bbσ´£
W
2
,W
¤
if θ = H and σ = bbσ
W if θ = H and σ ∈
³bbσ, 1i
with corresponding expected welfare:
E
£
UWCFB
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
W if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]
W + W
4
[R+ b− (1− σ)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
³bσ, bbσi
W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
³bbσ, 1i .
When θ = L, or θ = H and its informativeness is low, i.e. σ ∈ [1/2, bσ], there is no
entrepreneurs’ investment as the expected NPV inclusive of eﬀort costs is negative. When
θ = H and σ ∈
³bσ, bbσi, undertaking all available projects is suboptimal because it would lead
to capital rationing if a liquidity shock hits the economy. Hence, the optimal constrained
first-best investment is the highest possible amount that prevents capital rationing from
happening, ICFB =W/2. Only when the probability of a liquidity shock is suﬃciently low,
i.e. σ ∈
³bbσ, 1i, undertaking all available projects is optimal in the constrained eﬃcient
equilibrium (ICFB = W ) even if it may lead to capital rationing. Social welfare under
the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium is unaﬀected by σ when there is no investment, i.e.
σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]; and it is strictly increasing in σ otherwise.
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2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the competitive equilibrium by backward induction. We
start from the equilibrium in the market for liquidity at date 1, and then proceed backwards
to the equilibrium in the market for funding at date 0.
2.2.1 Market for Liquidity
When eλ = 0, there is no market for liquidity because there is no demand for new financing.
When eλ = 1, all entrepreneurs need new funds. Therefore, the aggregate demand of liquidity
is:
LD =
(
0 if eλ = 0
I∗ if eλ = 1 ,
where I∗ is the equilibrium aggregate investment by entrepreneurs. Let α1 be the share of
the project’s verifiable return R given to new financiers in exchange for additional financing
of a unit of capital. At date 0, each financier j invested I∗j in entrepreneurs’ technology
and W − I∗j in his own technology. Those financiers who realized a positive return on their
own technology (erj = 1/π), choose whether to provide new funds LSj ∈ £0, ¡W − I∗j ¢ /π¤ in
exchange for a fraction α1 of the project’s verifiable return R so as to maximize their utility:
max
LSj ∈[0,(W−I∗j )/π]
LSj α1R+
¡
W − I∗j
¢
/π − LSj
subject to entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint α1 ≤ 1. Given that there is a continuum of
financiers with mass 1 and i.i.d. erj, by the law of large numbers, the aggregate supply of
liquidity is
LS =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
W − I∗ if α1 > 1/R
[0,W − I∗] if α1 = 1/R
0 if α1 < 1/R
with α1 ≤ 1. In equilibrium, α1 is set to equate demand and supply of liquidity via an
inter-financier market where competitive financiers can transfer liquidity among themselves.
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If LD < W − I∗, then LS = LD and α∗1 = 1/R since there is excess supply of liquidity and
competition among financiers drives the return on new financing down to their opportunity
cost of 1. If instead LD > W − I∗, then LS = LD cannot be an equilibrium as financiers’
resources are insuﬃcient to meet the aggregate demand of liquidity. Therefore, there is
capital rationing and LS = W − I∗ < LD. Entrepreneurs compete for new funds thus
transferring all the surplus to financiers, who can now provide new financing at the maximum
possible rate satisfying entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint, α∗1 = 1. If LD = W − I∗, the
aggregate demand equals the aggregate supply of liquidity. In such case, LS = LDand the
cost of liquidity is indeterminate, α∗1 ∈ [1/R, 1].
Therefore, when eλ = 1, the equilibrium in the market for liquidity is
{L∗, α∗1} =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
©
I∗, 1R
ª
if I∗ < W
2©
W
2
,
£
1
R , 1
¤ª
if I∗ = W
2
{W − I∗, 1} if I∗ > W
2
. (2)
When financiers net worth falls short of the liquidity needs, entrepreneurs will be capital
rationed. The proportion of new financing, conditional on the liquidity shock, for each
entrepreneur is:
ρ∗ =
(
1 if I∗ ≤ W
2
W−I∗
I∗ if I
∗ > W
2
. (3)
2.2.2 Market for Funding
We can now proceed backwards to date 0 when the market for funding opens.
Demand of Funding. Competitive entrepreneurs take the cost of financing α0 and the
aggregate investment I∗ as given. They are rational and can perfectly foresee the contin-
uation of the game: they know the equilibrium α∗1 as in (2), and the proportion of new
financing ρ∗ as in (3).
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Entrepreneurs’ optimal investment policy is the solution to the following maximization
problem:
max
ID∈[0,W ]
ID {(1− α0) [μθ + (1− μθ) ρ∗ (1− α∗1)]R+ [μθ + (1− μθ) ρ∗] b− k} . (4)
Each entrepreneur retains a fraction 1 − α0 of the project’s expected verifiable value
[μθ + (1− μθ)ρ∗(1− α∗1)]R, and consumes the project’s non-verifiable value or private bene-
fit b with probability μθ+(1− μθ) ρ∗. Regardless of the liquidity shock, entrepreneurs incur
an eﬀort cost k.
The aggregate demand of funds can then be characterized as:
ID =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
W if α0 < 1− k−[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ
∗]b
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
[0,W ] if α0 = 1− k−[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ
∗]b
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
0 if α0 > 1− k−[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ
∗]b
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
. (5)
When the expected marginal return from investment exceeds its expected marginal cost, it
is optimal to invest as much as possible, ID = W . Otherwise, it is optimal not to invest.
When the cost of financing α0 = 1− k−[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ
∗]b
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
, entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent among
any values of ID ∈ [0,W ].
Supply of Funding. Taking the equilibrium values of α∗1 in (2) and the proportion of new
financing ρ∗ in (3) as given, financiers choose the supply of capital IS ∈ [0,W ] to maximize
expected utility:
max
IS∈[0,W ]
ISα0 [μθ + (1− μθ) ρ∗ (1− α∗1)]R+
¡
W − IS
¢
[μθ + (1− μθ)α∗1R] (6)
subject to entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint α0 ≤ 1, where α0 is the share of the project’s
verifiable return R given to financiers in exchange for one unit of capital.
With probability μθ there is no liquidity shock, and financiers consume the payoﬀ from
the funds supplied to entrepreneurs, ISα0R, plus any payoﬀ from the investment in their own
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idiosyncratic technology,
¡
W − IS
¢
, with expected return of 1. With probability (1− μθ)
there is a liquidity shock, and financiers consume the payoﬀ from the funds supplied to
entrepreneurs net of dilution by new financiers, ISα0ρ∗ (1− α∗1)R, and the payoﬀ from any
capital used for new financing,
¡
W − IS
¢
α∗1R.
Hence, the supply of funds can be summarized as:
IS =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
W if α0 >
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
[0,W ] if α0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
0 if α0 <
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
(7)
with α0 ≤ 1. When the expected marginal benefit of financing exceeds its expected mar-
ginal cost, it is optimal to supply as much capital as possible, IS = W . Otherwise, it
is optimal to invest the capital in financiers’ own technology and potentially use the pro-
ceeds for future financing. When α0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
, financiers are indiﬀerent among
any values of IS ∈ [0,W ] as long as entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint is not binding
( μθ+(1−μθ)α
∗
1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
≤ 1).
Equilibrium Funding. In equilibrium, given perfect competition and enough resources
to finance all available projects at date 0, financiers must be indiﬀerent ex-ante between
financing entrepreneurs and investing in their own technology (including the provision of
future liquidity) as long as entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint is met (α0 ≤ 1). Hence, the
equilibrium cost of financing at date 0 can be characterized as:
α∗0 =
μθ + (1− μθ)α∗1R
[μθ + (1− μθ) ρ∗ (1− α∗1)]R
(8)
provided that μθ + (1− μθ)α∗1R ≤ [μθ + (1− μθ) ρ∗ (1− α∗1)]R. Otherwise, there is no
financing (α∗0 = {∅}) because entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint cannot be met.
Given the cost of liquidity provision α∗1 in (2), the proportion of new financing ρ∗ in
(3), and the cost of financing α∗0 in (8), market clearing requires aggregate demand of funds
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to equal aggregate supply: I∗ = ID = IS as given in (5) and (7), respectively. The next
proposition characterizes the competitive market equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Competitive Market Equilibrium). Let bσ ≡ 2+ k−R− b, σ ≡ R+k−b
2R−1
and σ ≡ R+k
2R+b−1 . The investment in the competitive equilibrium is:
I∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if θ = L or
¡
θ = H and σ ∈
£
1
2
, bσ¢¢
[0, W
2
] if θ = H and σ = bσ
W
2
if θ = H and σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
(1−σ)b
R+k+b−σ(2R+2b−1)W if θ = H and σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¢
W if θ = H and σ ∈
£
σ, 1
¤
with the corresponding cost of financing
α∗0 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∅ if θ = L or (θ = H and σ ∈ [1/2, 2−R))
1
R+σ−1 if θ = H and σ ∈ [2−R, bσ]
R+σ−k+b
R+σ+k−b if θ = H and σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
σ+(1−σ)R
σR if θ = H and σ ∈ (σ, 1]
.
To complete the description of the competitive equilibrium, we characterize the equilib-
rium in the market for liquidity at date 1 (conditional on θ = H and eλ = 1) from Proposition
2 as:
{α∗1, ρ∗, L∗} =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
©
1
R , 1, 0
ª
if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]n
R+b−σ−k
2(1−σ)R , 1,
W
2
o
if σ ∈ (bσ, σ]n
1, R+k−σ(2R+b+1)
(1−σ)b ,
R+k−σ(2R+b−1)
R+k+b−σ(2R+2b−1)W
o
if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
{1, 0, 0} if σ ∈ ¡σ, 1¤
.
Figures 2 and 3 provide graphical representations of the competitive equilibria as a
function of the public signal’s informativeness σ, conditional on θ = H in the market for
funding, and conditional on θ = H and eλ = 1 in the market for liquidity, respectively. Each
figure is further separated into three regions corresponding to no capital rationing, moderate
and severe capital rationing if there is a liquidity shock.
When θ = L, or θ = H and the public signal’s informativeness is particularly low, i.e.
σ ∈ [1/2, 2−R), there is no supply of funding at any feasible rate (α0 ≤ 1) because the
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expected pledgeable return is not suﬃciently large to cover the investment cost. When
θ = H, and the public signal’s informativeness is low, i.e. σ ∈ [2−R, bσ), there is also
no investment as its expected NPV inclusive of eﬀort costs is negative, even if the cost of
financing entrepreneurs’ investment, α∗0, decreases with the likelihood of no liquidity shock,
σ = Pr
³eλ = 0|θ = H´.
When the public signal’s informativeness is in the low-medium range, i.e. σ ∈ (bσ, σ],
the strategy for all entrepreneurs to invest I∗ > W/2 cannot be an equilibrium as, in such
case, anticipating full dilution in the refinancing stage (α∗1 = 1) because of capital rationing
in the event of a liquidity shock, the cost of financing, α∗0, would be suﬃciently high to
prevent entrepreneurs from investing. Similarly, I∗ < W/2 cannot be an equilibrium as, in
such case, the cost of financing, α∗0, would be suﬃciently low (in anticipation of no capital
rationing) to induce all entrepreneurs to fully invest. Thus, in equilibrium I∗ = W/2, and
entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent among any level of investment. This equilibrium is achieved
with the cost of financing α∗0 and α∗1 increasing with σ, even if the likelihood of a liquidity
shock decreases.
When the public signal’s informativeness is in the medium-high range, i.e. σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¢
,
there exist only equilibria for I∗ ∈
¡
W
2
,W
¢
. I∗ = W/2 can no longer be an equilibrium
because the lower likelihood of a liquidity shock makes entrepreneurs’ investment more at-
tractive, and the cost of financing, which is already at the highest possible level (α∗1 = 1),
cannot increase any further. In this case, there exists an aggregate level of investment I∗ for
which entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent on the investment decision. The higher the informative-
ness of the public signal, the larger the equilibrium investment because of its higher expected
payoﬀ. However, the larger the current investment, the lower the equilibrium proportion of
new financing ρ∗ because of the fewer resources available in the future. Therefore, if there
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is a liquidity shock, entrepreneurs will be rationed and financiers will extract the maximum
possible rents from providing liquidity to the competing entrepreneurs at the maximum pos-
sible rate, α∗1 = 1. In anticipation of full dilution in the refinancing stage (α∗1 = 1) because
of capital rationing, the current financing is overall more expensive reaching its maximum
at σ = σ. Furthermore, an increase in σ has (i) a negative direct eﬀect on the equilibrium
cost of financing because it decreases the probability of a liquidity shock, 1 − σ, thus in-
creasing the project’s expected verifiable value, and (ii) a positive indirect eﬀect through
the decreased proportion of new financing ρ∗, which reduces the project’s expected verifiable
value. That is, an increase in σ, while making the liquidity shock less likely, conditional on
the liquidity shock it increases the proportion of capital rationing. Overall, an increase in
the informativeness of the public signal makes financing less expensive as capital rationing
becomes unconditionally less likely.
Finally, when the public signal’s informativeness is high, i.e. σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤
, all entrepreneurs
invest and capital rationing is at the highest level. The more informative the positive public
signal, the lower the financing cost that in equilibrium competitive financiers can charge
to competing entrepreneurs as capital rationing becomes unconditionally less likely. At the
extreme, when the signal is perfectly informative, i.e. σ = 1, financiers cannot extract any
rents, α∗0 = 1/R, as the unconditional probability of capital rationing becomes zero since
there is no liquidity shock for sure, i.e. Pr (λ = 0|θ = H) = 1.
2.2.3 Ineﬃcient Investment
Figure 4 compares the aggregate investment in the competitive equilibrium (as described in
Proposition 2) with the constrained eﬃcient allocation as in Proposition 1. The competitive
equilibrium exhibits excessive investment when σ ∈
³
σ, bbσ´. The social planner invests only
W/2 to avoid capital rationing in the refinancing market. Conversely, the investment in the
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competitive equilibrium exceeds W/2, thus making capital rationing likely.
The economic sources of over-investment are uninsurable aggregate liquidity shocks and
entrepreneurs’ limited commitment. Consider first the eﬀect of insurance. If entrepreneurs
could insure against liquidity shocks, the price of insurance would make them fully inter-
nalize the risk of liquidity shortage. For instance, insurance could be achieved by allowing
tradeable assets with payoﬀs independent of liquidity shocks such as a riskless asset or
traded claims on financiers’ idiosyncratic technologies. Agents could then insure against
liquidity by holding a portfolio of these claims. However, market incompleteness and the
non-verifiability of financiers’ payoﬀs rule out such possibilities. Similarly, entrepreneurs
could also insure against liquidity shocks by purchasing insurance contracts such as lines of
credit. However, the non-verifiability of financiers’ payoﬀs also makes contracts incomplete
as financiers cannot credibly write such contracts.
Consider next the impact of limited commitment. If entrepreneurs’ investment returns
were fully verifiable (b = 0), then financiers would fully price the risk of liquidity shortage
in the cost of financing, regardless of the existence of an insurance market for liquidity.
In fact, with b = 0, the ineﬃcient investment region disappears (σ = σ = bbσ ) and the
competitive equilibrium coincides with the constrained eﬃcient allocation. With b > 0,
ineﬃcient investment arises because the equilibrium cost of financing α∗0 is independent of
the non-verifiable return b, and as such, it does not fully reflect the social cost of liquidity
shortages.
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2.3 Social Welfare
The equilibrium social welfare is defined as the sum of entrepreneurs’ and financiers’ expected
utilities:
E
£
UW
¤
= E
£
UE
¤
+E
£
UF
¤
=
X
θ∈{L,H}
£
E
¡
UE|θ¢+E ¡UF |θ¢¤Pr (θ) (9)
Alternatively, it can be computed as the sum of the financiers’ endowment W and the
expected net present value from investment:
E
£
UW
¤
=W +
1
2
{[σR+ (1− σ) ρ∗ (R− 1)] + [σ + (1− σ) ρ∗] b− 1− k} I∗ (10)
where I∗ and ρ∗ are given in Proposition 2 and equation (3), respectively. The following
proposition characterizes the social welfare under the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Social Welfare). The social welfare in the competitive market equilibrium
is:
E
£
UW
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
W if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]
W + W
4
[R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)] if σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤
with entrepreneurs’ and financiers’ expected utilities:
E
£
UE
¤
=
(
0 if σ ∈
£
1/2, σ
¤
W
2
[σ(R+ b)− (1− σ) (R− 1)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤
and
E
£
UF
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
W if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]
W + W
4
(R+ σ + b− k − 2) if σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈ (σ, 1]
.
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the social welfare, the entrepreneurs’
and the financiers’ expected utilities as functions of the public signal’s informativeness σ.
As the figure shows, an increase in the quality of public information, not only aﬀects non
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monotically the social welfare, but also has redistributive eﬀects between entrepreneurs and
financiers.
When the signal informativeness is low, i.e. σ ∈ [1/2, bσ], the social welfare equals
financiers’ endowment as there is no investment. Hence, a marginal increase in σ has no
eﬀect on social welfare.
When the informativeness of the public signal is in the medium-low range, i.e. σ ∈ (bσ, σ],
aggregate investment is W/2. Entrepreneurs make no profit, while financiers extract a rent.
The social welfare is strictly increasing in σ as the increase in the expected investment payoﬀ
outweighs the higher cost of financing necessary to keep the level of investment constant.
When the informativeness of the public signal is in the medium-high range, i.e. σ ∈¡
σ, σ
¤
, entrepreneurs have zero expected utility as they are indiﬀerent among any level of
investment. A marginal increase in σ leaves unaﬀected entrepreneurs’ welfare as the increase
in the investment’s expected net verifiable value is exactly oﬀset by the decrease in the
expected non-verifiable value given the increased proportion of capital rationing. However,
financiers’ expected welfare decreases monotonically with the public signal’s informativeness
for any σ ∈ (σ, 1]: financiers make profits only from liquidity provision in the event of capital
rationing, whose likelihood decreases with σ. Therefore, an increase in σ, while leaving
entrepreneurs’ utility unaﬀected, reduces financiers’ expected profits and aﬀects negatively
the social welfare, i.e. ∂E
£
UW
¤
/∂σ = −W (R− 1) /2 < 0.
When the public signal is highly informative, i.e.
¡
σ, 1
¤
, an increase in σ improves
entrepreneurs’ welfare as now there is not only an increase in the expected net verifiable
value of investment (higher expected investment payoﬀ and lower cost of financing), but
also an increase in the expected non-verifiable value given that the proportion of capital
rationing, already at its maximum, cannot increase any further. Therefore, the reduction in
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financiers’ expected profits is now balanced against the increase in entrepreneurs’ welfare,
with a net positive eﬀect on social welfare, i.e. ∂E
£
UW
¤
/∂σ =W (R+ b)/2 > 0.
The non-monotonic relationship between the public signal’s informativeness, σ, and the
social welfare, E
£
UW
¤
, exists as long as σ > σ. A necessary condition is b > 0. However,
this condition is not suﬃcient. In addition, we need Assumption 2 (k ≥ b): entrepreneurs
incur an eﬀort cost k suﬃciently large to oﬀset the private benefit of investment b. This
assumption ensures the existence of a trade-oﬀ in the entrepreneurs’ demand for funding:
because of the eﬀort cost, wealthless entrepreneurs may find optimal not to invest if they
expect a suﬃciently high proportion of capital rationing.
2.3.1 Welfare Comparison
Figure 6 compares the social welfare under the constrained eﬃcient and competitive equilib-
ria as functions of the public signal’s informativeness σ. The constrained eﬃcient allocation
increases welfare by
∆E[UW ] ≡ E[UWCFB]− E[UW ] =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
W
4
[σ (2R− 1) + b−R− k] > 0 if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
W
4
[(R+ b+ k)− σ (2R+ 2b− 1)] > 0 if σ ∈
³
σ, bbσi
0 otherwise
.
The welfare under the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium strictly dominates the competitive
equilibrium welfare for σ ∈
³
σ, bbσi: unlike the social planner, atomistic entrepreneurs cannot
coordinate their individual actions to avoid capital rationing in the competitive equilibrium.
In the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium, there is less investment than the competitive market
equilibrium for σ ∈
³
σ, bbσi. The diﬀerence arises because entrepreneurs do not internalize the
negative externality their individual investment decisions have on the proportion of capital
rationing and the cost of financing.
The increase in social welfare under the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium benefits entirely
entrepreneurs while making financiers worse oﬀ. The diﬀerence in entrepreneurs’ welfare
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under the constrained eﬃcient and the competitive equilibrium allocation is
∆E[UE] =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
W
4
(R− 2 + σ + b− k) > 0 if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
W
4
[(R+ b+ k)− σ (2R+ 2b− 1)] + W
2
(1− σ)(R− 1) > 0 if σ ∈
³
σ, bbσi
0 otherwise
while the diﬀerence in financiers’ welfare is
∆E[UF ] =
(
−W
2
(1− σ)(R− 1) < 0 if σ ∈
³
σ, bbσi
0 otherwise
.
Therefore, moving from the competitive equilibrium to the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium
is not a Pareto improvement.
3 Normative Analysis
So far we have focused on the positive properties of the equilibrium. We now analyze
its normative aspects by examining how the economy can achieve the constrained eﬃcient
outcome. We focus on optimal information disclosure and optimal investment restrictions.1
3.1 Targeted Disclosure of Information
In this section, we consider whether society can do better, relative to the equilibrium with
public information, by making information available only to a subset of entrepreneurs.2
Therefore, we solve for the competitive market equilibrium in an otherwise identical econ-
omy, which diﬀers only for the information structure: the signal θ is given as private infor-
mation to each entrepreneur with some probability γ. Since we have a continuum of identical
1While not the focus of the current paper, optimal taxation contingent on the informativeness of public
information is also a mechanism to achieve the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium. For instance, imposing on
financiers a lump-sum tax, T0 = W2 1{σ∈[σ,??σ)} optimally restrict the equilibrium financing at date 0. Then,
at date 1 the tax proceeds can be returned to financiers and potentially used for liquidity provision.
2For instance, central banks and international institutions like IMF and the World Bank use publications
and press releases to disseminate information publicly to a wide audience; while they use speeches, interviews
and private meetings to disclose only to a specific audience (see Cornand and Heinemann, 2008).
— 20 —
entrepreneurs, the fraction of entrepreneurs who receive information equals γ almost cer-
tainly. Without loss of generality, we may assume that entrepreneurs i ∈ [0, γ] receive the
signal θ and entrepreneurs i ∈ (γ, 1] are uninformed. To allow for a direct comparison
with the case of public information, we assume that the same signal θ is distributed to all
informed entrepreneurs i ∈ [0, γ]. Uninformed entrepreneurs can neither observe informed
entrepreneurs’ individual actions nor aggregate outcomes to infer the signal θ; nor they can
buy information about θ from informed entrepreneurs.
We find the subgame perfect equilibria by backwards induction, starting from the market
for liquidity at date 1. Since the aggregate demand and supply of liquidity are identical to the
public information case, the equilibrium outcomes conditional on eλ = 1 can be conveniently
summarized as
{α∗1, ρ∗} =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
©
1
R , 1
ª
if I∗ < W
2©£
1
R , 1
¤
, 1
ª
if I∗ = W
2©
1, W−I
∗
I∗
ª
if I∗ > W
2
. (11)
When eλ = 0, there is no market for liquidity since there is no aggregate demand. At date
0 the market for funding opens. For a fraction γ of entrepreneurs with access to the signal,
the individual demand for funding is exactly as in (5). The fraction 1 − γ of uninformed
entrepreneurs instead do not invest because the expected net present value is negative as
R ≤ 3/2 by Assumption 3. Hence, the aggregate demand of funds is
ID =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
γW if θ = H & α0 < 1− k−[σ+(1−σ)ρ
∗]b
[σ+(1−σ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
[0, γW ] if θ = H & α0 = 1− k−[σ+(1−σ)ρ
∗]b
[σ+(1−σ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
0 if θ = H & α0 > 1− k−[σ+(1−σ)ρ
∗]b
[σ+(1−σ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
. (12)
Since only informed entrepreneurs with θ = H demand capital, financiers can always infer
the information content of the signal, thus the supply of funding does not change from the
case with public information. In equilibrium, competitive financiers must be indiﬀerent ex-
ante between financing entrepreneurs and investing in their own technology, implying that
α∗0 is as given in (8) and I∗ = ID as in (12). As shown in Appendix A, first we compute
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the social welfare corresponding to the competitive equilibrium with targeted disclosure of
information, and then we maximize it to find the optimal information disclosure γ∗. The
next proposition summarizes the main result.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Information Disclosure). The optimal information disclosure
policy is
γ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[0, 1] if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]£
1
2
, 1
¤
if σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
1
2
if σ ∈
³
σ, bbσ´£
1
2
, 1
¤
if σ = bbσ
1 if σ ∈
³bbσ, 1i
where bσ ≡ 2+k−R−b, σ ≡ R+k−b
2R−1 and
bbσ ≡ R+k+b
2R+2b−1 , and the corresponding social welfare
is E
£
UWγ∗
¤
= E
£
UWCFB
¤
.
Intuitively, given that uninformed entrepreneurs do not invest, when γ ≤ 1/2 there is
no risk of capital rationing as all entrepreneurs can secure new funds if a liquidity shock
occurs. If instead, γ is chosen above 1/2, the results are only qualitatively diﬀerent from
those obtained in Proposition 2. The equilibrium social welfare is defined as the sum of
informed (I) and uninformed (U) entrepreneurs’ and financiers’ expected utilities. Evaluated
at the optimal disclosure, the welfare function is identical to the one in Proposition 3.
Hence, a regulator can perfectly replicate the constrained eﬃcient solution by optimally
choosing the information disclosure γ. The optimal disclosure policy increases with the
quality of information. For low σ, a limited information disclosure prevents excess risk
taking by eﬀectively confining aggregate investment to informed entrepreneurs. For high
σ, full information disclosure is optimal as the probability that risk taking reduces welfare
becomes suﬃciently low.
It is important to note that the eﬀectiveness of the targeted information disclosure rests
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on the assumption that uninformed agents are unable to infer private information from
observing aggregate outcomes or informed agents’ individual actions. Allowing agents to
condition their actions on aggregate outcomes would undo the eﬀectiveness of such a policy.3
3.2 Investment Restrictions
In this section, we consider whether the constrained eﬃcient solution can be replicated
by imposing restrictions on financiers’ investment in entrepreneurs’ technology. For this
purpose, we solve for the competitive market equilibrium in an otherwise identical economy,
which diﬀers for the fact that financiers can now allocate only up to a fraction χ of their
capital endowment W to finance entrepreneurs. We then solve for the optimal χ ∈ [0, 1].
We characterize the competitive market equilibrium by backward induction as in the
case without investment restrictions, with the only exception that each financier’s supply of
capital at date 0 is restricted to ISj ∈ [0, χW ]. The critical diﬀerence from the case without
investment restrictions is that now there may be capital rationing at date 0 because of the
constraint on the investment in the entrepreneurs’ technology.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal policy.
Proposition 5 (Optimal Investment Restrictions). The optimal choice of investment
restrictions is
χ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[0, 1] if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]£
1
2
, 1
¤
if σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
1
2
if σ ∈
³
σ, bbσ´£
1
2
, 1
¤
if σ = bbσ
1 if σ ∈
³bbσ, 1i
3Even though outside of the model, the ability of uninformed agents to condition their actions on con-
temporaneous aggregate outcomes or informed agents’ individual actions, can indeed be limited in reality
by the existence of observational lags.
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where bσ ≡ 2+k−R−b, σ ≡ R+k−b
2R−1 and
bbσ ≡ R+k+b
2R+2b−1 , and the corresponding social welfare
is E
£
UWχ∗
¤
= E
£
UWCFB
¤
.
In the proof of Proposition 5, first we characterize the competitive market equilibrium
with investment restrictions. Then, we maximize the corresponding social welfare to find
the optimal investment restriction χ∗. The critical diﬀerence from Proposition 2 arises when
χ ≤ 1/2 as now there is no capital rationing.
Evaluated at the optimal investment restriction χ∗, the welfare function is identical to
the one in Proposition 1. Hence, a regulator can perfectly replicate the constrained eﬃcient
solution by limiting the size of financiers’ investment in entrepreneurs’ technology to χ∗:
the worst the quality of the public information, the tighter the restriction on financiers’
investment.
4 Conclusion
It is commonly believed that disclosure of more precise information by institutions such
as government agencies, central banks, international organizations and rating agencies is
socially valuable. For instance, among the various policy responses to the turbulence in
international financial markets there has been a call for increased transparency through
better disclosure from governments and other oﬃcial bodies (International Monetary Fund,
1998, 2008). The International Monetary Fund has actively encouraged its members to be
more transparent and made more of its own documents publicly available (Glennerster and
Shin, 2003).4
4Among those there are IMF country documents and, in particular, Article IV reports, which evaluate
the macroeconomic performance of all member countries; the production and publication of Reports on the
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), which assess members’ institutions; and the creation of the
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), which sets common definitions for macroeconomic data as
well as minimum frequency and timeliness standards.
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This paper investigates the impact of public information in an economy with uninsurable
aggregate liquidity shocks and limited commitment. In equilibrium, a negative externality
in entrepreneurs’ investment decisions may cause excessive risk taking in the presence of
an informative public signal about the quality of the investment. Public information, while
acting as “information equalizer” which reduces any information gaps among entrepreneurs,
directs all entrepreneurs towards the same action and, thereby, may trigger systemic liquidity
shortages. The negative externality arises endogenously from the competitive nature of
entrepreneurs, who cannot internalize through prices the impact of their investment decisions
on the equilibrium risk of liquidity shortages.
The quality of public information has also redistributive eﬀects. Entrepreneurs always
prefer high quality information to maximize their return on investment. Conversely, fi-
nanciers prefer low information quality associated with liquidity crises because they extract
rents from capital rationing.
How can a social planner tackle information sensitive ineﬃciencies? First, investment
restrictions can achieve constrained eﬃciency, provided that they are based on the resources
available at the aggregate rather than at the individual level, and that they are contingent on
the quality of public information. Second, targeting information disclosure can also achieve
constrained eﬃciency. Making the same information private and available only to a subset
of entrepreneurs reduces over-investment.
With optimal investment restrictions or targeted disclosure of information, improving
the quality of information is always welfare increasing. Hence, institutions aﬀecting the
allocative eﬃciency in the economy including central banks and government agencies can
freely focus on the achievement of their social priorities without having to decide which
information to disclose or withhold from the public as long as there are optimal investment
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restrictions in place. However, without optimal investment restrictions, disclosure policies
become critical for the prevention of information-induced liquidity crises: targeting the dis-
closure of low-quality information (e.g. preliminary or incomplete data and noisy forecasts)
is beneficial.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
The social planner’s objective is given in equation (1). If ρ = min
©
W−I
I , 1
ª
= 1, the social
planner’s objective simplifies to
maxI∈[0,W2 ]
W + [μθ (R+ b) + (1− μθ) (R+ b− 1)− (1 + k)] I.
Otherwise, if ρ = min
©
W−I
I , 1
ª
= W−II , the social planner’s objective becomes
maxI∈[W2 ,W ]
W +
£
μθ (R+ b) + (1− μθ)
¡
W−I
I
¢
(R+ b− 1)− (1 + k)
¤
I .
The optimal solution, ICFB ∈ [0,W ], follows from the first-order conditions and can be
summarized as
ICFB =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if μθ < bσ
[0, W
2
] if μθ = bσ
W
2
if μθ ∈
³bσ, bbσ´£
W
2
,W
¤
if μθ = bbσ
W if μθ > bbσ
where bσ ≡ 2+k−R− b and bbσ ≡ R+b+k
2(R+b)−1 . Given that μH = σ ≥ 1/2 and μL = 1−σ ≤ 1/2,
and that R ≤ 3/2 by Assumption 3, we have:
ICFB =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if θ = L or if (θ = H and σ < bσ)
[0, W
2
] if θ = H and σ = bσ
W
2
if θ = H and σ ∈
³bσ, bbσ´£
W
2
,W
¤
if θ = H and σ = bbσ
W if θ = H and σ > bbσ
.
The social welfare corresponding to the constrained first-best (CFB) allocations is then
computed as E
£
UWCFB
¤
=
P
θ E
£
UWCFB|θ
¤
Pr (θ), with Pr (θ = H) = Pr (θ = L) = 1/2.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Given the expressions for α∗1 in (2), ρ∗ in (3) and α∗0 in (8), consider first I∗ = 0. In
this case, ρ∗ = 1, α∗1 = 1/R and α∗0 =
1
(R−1+μθ)
. Given (5), this is an equilibrium only
if μθ < bσ = 2 + k − R − b. Consider next I∗ = W . In this case, ρ∗ = 0, α∗1 = 1 and
α∗0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)R
μθR
. This is an equilibrium only if μθ > σ ≡ R+k2R+b−1 . In all remaining cases,
the equilibrium must be such that entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between investing and not
investing. Consider then I∗ ∈ (W/2,W ). In such case, α∗1 = 1, α∗0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)R
μθR
, and
ρ∗ = W−I
∗
I∗ . For this to be an equilibrium, entrepreneurs must be indiﬀerent among any
level of investment, that is,
μθR− [μθ + (1− μθ)R] +
∙
μθ + (1− μθ)
µ
W − I∗
I∗
¶¸
b = k
or
I∗ =
(1− μθ) b
R+ k + b− μθ (2R+ 2b− 1)
W.
This equilibrium exists only if I∗ ∈
¡
W
2
,W
¢
, which corresponds to σ < μθ < σ, where
σ ≡ R+k−b
2R−1 . Consider next I
∗ = W/2. In such case, ρ∗ = 1, α∗0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)(1−α∗1)]R
and α∗1
is such that entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent among any level of investment, that is,
μθ + (1− μθ)α∗1R
[μθ + (1− μθ) (1− α∗1)]R
= 1− k − [μθ + (1− μθ)] b
[μθ + (1− μθ) (1− α∗1)]R
or
α∗1 =
R+ b− μθ − k
2 (1− μθ)R
.
This equilibrium exists only if α∗1 ∈
¡
1
R , 1
¢
, which corresponds to bσ < μθ < σ. Finally,
consider I∗ ∈ (0,W/2). In such case, α∗1 = 1/R, α∗0 = 1/ (R− 1 + μθ), and ρ∗ = 1. This
equilibrium exists only if entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent among any level of investment, which
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corresponds to μθ = bσ. Hence, we can summarize the equilibrium investment as:
I∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if μθ < bσ
[0, W
2
] if μθ = bσ
W
2
if μθ ∈ (bσ, σ]
(1−μθ)b
R+k+b−μθ(2R+2b−1)
W if μθ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¢
W if μθ ≥ σ
.
Similarly, the equilibrium cost of financing is
α∗0 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∅ if μθ < 2−R
1
R+μθ−1
if μθ ∈ [2−R, bσ]
R+μθ−k+b
R+μθ+k−b
if μθ ∈ (bσ, σ]
μθ+(1−μθ)R
μθR
if μθ > σ
.
Notice that when μθ < 2 − R there is no supply of funding at any feasible rate (α0 ≤ 1)
as entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint cannot be met. Hence, α∗0 = {∅}. In all other cases,
entrepreneurs’ solvency constraint is always satisfied as α∗0 ≤ 1 under Assumption 2.
Given that μH = σ ≥ 1/2 and μL = 1 − σ ≤ 1/2, the equilibrium investment under
Assumptions 1-3 can be characterized as in Proposition 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The social welfare is defined as the sum of entrepreneurs’ and financiers’ expected utilities:
E
£
UW
¤
=
X
θ∈{L,H}
£
E
¡
UE|θ¢+E ¡UF |θ¢¤Pr (θ)
where
E
¡
UE|θ¢ = {μθ (R− 1 + b) + (1− μθ) [ρ∗ (1− α∗1)R− α∗1R+ ρ∗b]− k} I∗
E
¡
UF |θ¢ = W [μθ + (1− μθ)α∗1R]
with I∗, ρ∗ and α∗1 as given in Proposition 2. There are four cases to consider:
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(1) if σ ≤ bσ, there is no investment regardless of θ: E ¡UE¢ = 0, E ¡UF¢ = W and
E
£
UW
¤
=W ;
(2) if σ ∈ (bσ, σ], there is investment (I∗ = W
2
) only when θ = H: E
¡
UE
¢
= 0, E
¡
UF
¢
=
W +W R+σ+b−k−2
4
, and
E
£
UW
¤
=W +
W
4
[R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)] ;
(3) if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
, there is moderate capital rationing when θ = H: E
¡
UE
¢
= 0, E
¡
UF
¢
=
W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1), and
E
£
UW
¤
=W +
W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) ;
(4) if σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤
, there is severe capital rationing when θ = H: E
¡
UE
¢
=
W
2
[σ(R+ b)− (1− σ) (R− 1)− (1 + k)], E
¡
UF
¢
=W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1), and
E
£
UW
¤
=W +
W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
The social welfare if γ > 1/2 is as described in Proposition 3, with the only diﬀerence that
the aggregate entrepreneurs’ investment I∗ equals γW when σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤
rather than W :
E
£
UW
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
W if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]
W + W
4
[R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)] if σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
W + γW
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤ .
This expression is weakly increasing in γ and thus it is optimal to disclose information to
everybody (γ = 1) when γ > 1/2.
If instead γ ≤ 1/2, the economy is never liquidity constrained and thus α∗1 = 1/R and
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ρ∗ = 1. Hence, the social welfare becomes:
E
£
UW
¤
=
(
W if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]
W + γW
2
[R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)] if σ ∈ (bσ, 1] .
Given that E
£
UW
¤
is strictly increasing in γ, the optimal choice of γ conditional on γ ≤ 1/2
is to set γ = 1/2.
Comparing the two cases above, it is optimal to disclose information only to a fraction 1/2
of entrepreneurs (γ∗ = 1/2) if and only if
³
σ, bbσ´ and disclose the information to everybody
(γ∗ = 1) when σ ∈
³bbσ, 1i; while the choice of γ is irrelevant otherwise.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
The structure of the proof is as follows: (i) we derive the competitive market equilibrium
under capital restrictions; (ii) we derive the social welfare; and (iii) we solve for the optimal
capital requirements.
(i) There are three cases to distinguish. If χ = 1, the market equilibrium is as described
in Proposition 2. If instead χ ≤ 1/2, there is a financial constraint at date 0, but not at
date 1. Hence, α∗1 = 1/R and ρ∗ = 1. When ID ≤ χW , the financial constraint at date
0 does not bind and α∗0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
= 1R−1+μθ
. However, when ID > χW , the
financial constraint binds, and the shortage of capital at date 0 implies that the cost of
capital raises to its highest level that makes entrepreneurs indiﬀerent among any level of
investment: α∗0 = 1 −
k−[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗]b
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
= 1 − k−bR−1+μθ . The market equilibrium in such
case is:
I∗ =
(
0 if θ = L or (θ = H & σ ∈ [1/2, bσ))
χW if θ = H & σ ∈ [bσ, 1] .
If χ ∈ [1/2, 1), there are financial constraints at both date 0 and date 1. When ID ≤
W/2 < χW , no financial constraints bind and α∗0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
= 1R−1+μθ
. When
— 34 —
W/2 < ID ≤ χW , the financial constraint at date 0 does not bind, but there is a financial
constraint at date 1. Hence, α∗1 = 1, ρ∗ =
W−I∗
I∗ , and α
∗
0 =
μθ+(1−μθ)α∗1R
[μθ+(1−μθ)ρ∗(1−α∗1)]R
= μθ+(1−μθ)RμθR
.
Following the proof in Proposition 2, this is an equilibrium with I∗ = (1−μθ)bR+k+b−μθ(2R+2b−1)W ,
which exists only if I∗ ∈ (W/2, χW ] or σ < μθ < σ (χ), where σ (χ) ≡ χ(R+k+b)−bχ(2R+2b−1)−b . Finally,
when ID > χW , both financial constraints at date 0 and date 1 bind. Hence, α∗1 = 1,
ρ∗ = 1−χχ , and α
∗
0 = 1−
k−[μθ+(1−μθ)
(1−χ)
χ ]b
μθR
. The market equilibrium in such case is:
I∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if θ = L or (θ = H & σ ∈ [1/2, bσ))
[0,W/2] if θ = H & σ = bσ
W/2 if θ = H & σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
(1−σ)b
R+k+b−σ(2R+2b−1)W if θ = H & σ ∈
¡
σ, σ(χ)
¤
χW if θ = H & σ ∈
¡
σ(χ), 1
¤
.
(ii) The social welfare if χ = 1 is as described in Proposition 3; if instead χ ≤ 1/2:
E
£
UW
¤
=
(
W if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ)
W + χW
2
[R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)] if θ = H & σ ∈ [bσ, 1] ;
while if χ ∈ [1/2, 1), the social welfare is:
E
£
UW
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
W if σ ∈ [1/2, bσ]
W + W
4
[R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)] if σ ∈ (bσ, σ]
W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ (χ)
¤
W + W
2
(
[χσ + (1− χ)(1− σ)] (R+ b)
−(1− σ)(1− χ)− (1 + k)χ
)
if σ ∈
¡
σ (χ) , 1
¤ .
(iii) Notice that E
£
UW
¤
is strictly increasing in χ for σ ∈ (bσ, 1] when χ ≤ 1/2. Hence, it is
optimal to choose χ∗ = 1/2 over that range of values. If instead, χ ∈ [1/2, 1), then E
£
UW
¤
is strictly decreasing in χ if σ < bbσ and strictly increasing in χ if σ > bbσ.
Hence, when σ ∈ [1/2, bσ], the choice of capital requirement is indeterminate: χ∗ ∈ [0, 1].
When σ ∈ (bσ, σ), the optimal choice is χ∗ = 1/2 as the social welfare is strictly increasing in χ
for χ ≤ 1/2 and is indeterminate if χ > 1/2. When σ ∈
¡
σ, σ (χ)
¤
, the optimal choice is χ∗ =
1/2 as [R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)] /2 > (1− σ) (R− 1) for σ > σ. When σ ∈
¡
σ (χ) , 1
¤
, the
comparison is between χ∗ = 1/2 with welfareW+W
4
[R− (1− σ) + b− (1 + k)], and χ∗ = 1
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with welfare W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)], which depends on whether σ is smaller or greater
than bbσ. If σ < bbσ, the optimal choice is to set χ∗ = 1/2; if instead σ > bbσ, the optimal choice
is to set χ∗ = 1.
Q.E.D.
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Appendix B
The positive analysis above on the role of public information quality as a trigger of alloca-
tive ineﬃciency is based on Assumption 3. To simplify the exposition of the analysis, we
assume that the investment opportunity is not good enough to be financed without public
information. We show here that our findings are robust to removing Assumption 3.
We now perform the same analysis as in Propositions 1-3 under the assumption R > 3/2.
Consider first the constrained first-best equilibrium. From the Proof of Proposition 1 we
have:
ICFB =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if θ = L and σ > 1− bσ
[0, W
2
] if θ = L and σ = 1− bσ
W
2
if (θ = L and σ < 1− bσ) and ³θ = H and σ < bbσ´£
W
2
,W
¤
if θ = H and σ = bbσ
W if θ = H and σ > bbσ
given that bbσ > 1/2. The corresponding welfare is
E
£
UWCFB
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
W + W
2
¡
R+ b− 3
2
− k
¢
if σ ∈ [1/2, 1− bσ]
W + W
4
[R+ b− (1− σ)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
³
1− bσ, bbσi
W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
³bbσ, 1i
if k > R+ b+ 1
2(R+b) − 2 so that 1− bσ < bbσ; and
E
£
UWCFB
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
W + W
2
¡
R+ b− 3
2
− k
¢
if σ ∈
h
1/2, bbσi
W + W
4
[R+ b− σ − (1 + k)] + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
³bbσ, 1− bσi
W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈ (1− bσ, 1]
if instead k < R+ b+ 1
2(R+b) − 2.
Consider next the competitive equilibrium. From the Proof of Proposition 2, we have:
I∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if θ = L and σ > 1− bσ
[0, W
2
] if θ = L and σ = 1− bσ
W
2
if (θ = L and σ < 1− bσ) and (θ = H and σ ≤ σ)
(1−σ)b
R+k+b−σ(2R+2b−1)W if θ = H and σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¢
W if θ = H and σ > σ
— 37 —
given that σ > 1/2. The corresponding welfare is:
E
£
UW
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
W + W
2
¡
R+ b− 3
2
− k
¢
if σ ∈ [1/2, 1− bσ]
W + W
4
[R+ b− (1− σ)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈ (1− bσ, σ]
W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤
if k > R+ b+ 1
2R − 2 so that 1− bσ < σ;
E
£
UW
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
W + W
2
¡
R+ b− 3
2
− k
¢
if σ ∈ [1/2, σ]
W + W
4
[R+ b− σ − (1 + k)] + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈ (σ, 1− bσ]
W + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈
¡
1− bσ, σ¤
W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
¡
σ, 1
¤
if k ∈
¡
R+ b+ 1
2R+b − 2, R+ b+
1
2R − 2
¢
; and
E
£
UW
¤
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
W + W
2
¡
R+ b− 3
2
− k
¢
if σ ∈ [1/2, σ]
W + W
4
[R+ b− σ − (1 + k)] + W
2
(1− σ) (R− 1) if σ ∈
¡
σ, σ
¤
W + W
4
[R+ b− σ − (1 + k)] + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈
¡
σ, 1− bσ¤
W + W
2
[σ (R+ b)− (1 + k)] if σ ∈ (1− bσ, 1]
if k < R+ b+ 1
2R+b − 2.
In all these cases, there exist a range of values of σ for which the social welfare decreases
with σ. Hence, the result that there is a non-monotonic relation between social welfare and
the informativeness of the public information is robust to removing Assumption 3. Similarly,
across all cases, there exist values of σ for which the welfare associated with the competitive
equilibrium is strictly lower than the welfare in the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium.
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Public signal { },H Lθ ∈  
 
• Entrepreneurs raise capital [ ]* 0,∈I W  to invest in risky 
projects and exert effort *kI .  
 
• Financiers allocate their endowment  
W  between financing entrepreneurs 
and investing in their own risky 
technology. 
Liquidity shock λ : 
 
( )
( )
0 . .
1 . . 1
w p
w p
μ θλ μ θ
⎧⎪= ⎨ −⎪⎩
 
 
• If 1λ = , entrepreneurs need to raise new 
funds *I : 
- a fraction 1ρ ≤  of the capital is 
refinanced; 
- the remaining capital is liquidated for 
nothing.   
 
• If 0λ = , there is no need for new funds.  
0 1 2 
• If 0λ = , the verifiable 
returns are *RI and the 
private benefits are *bI  
 
• If  1λ = , the verifiable 
returns are *ρ RI and the 
private benefits are *ρbI  
 
• Financiers are paid and 
entrepreneurs consume 
remaining profits and 
private benefits. 
Figure 1: Timeline, Actions and Payoﬀs
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Figure 2: Market for funding conditional on θ = H. Equilibrium α∗0 (dashed line) and I∗
(solid line) as a function of signal’s informativeness σ.
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*L
/ 2W
Figure 3: Market for liquidity conditional θ = H and λ = 1. Equilibrium α∗1 (dashed line),
ρ∗ (dashed-dotted line), and L∗ (solid line) as functions of signal’s informativeness σ.
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1 / 2  σ  1σ  σ  σˆ  
*I
W
2
W
ˆˆσ  
Figure 4: Optimal investment in the competitive equilibrium (solid line) and in the con-
strained eﬃcient equilibrium (dashed line) as functions of signal’s informativeness σ.
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Figure 5: Ex-ante social welfare (dotted line), entrepreneurs’ expected utility (dashed line)
and financiers’ expected utility (dashed-dotted line) in the competitive equilibrium as func-
tions of signal’s informativeness σ.
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 1/ 2  σ  1 σ  σ
W
σˆ ˆˆσ  
[ ]WE U  
Figure 6: Social welfare in the competitive equilibrium (solid line) and in the constrained
eﬃcient equilibrium (dashed line) as functions of signal’s informativeness σ.
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